Friday, February 22, 2008

End of Social Networking?

According to yesterday's article in the Guardian, the three largest social networks in the U.K., MySpace, Facebook, and Bebo, all experienced large drops in membership between December, 2007 and January, 2008. Is this one month of falling numbers a fluke or have the networks reached a plateau? Says, Alex Burmaster, Nielsen Online analyst, "One month of falling audiences doesn't spell the decline of Facebook or social networking. However, most of the leading social networks are less popular in the U.K. than they were a year ago."

Losses By the Numbers

According to the article, Facebook saw a 5% drop between December, 2007 and January, 2008, but still had 8.5 million users in January. This keeps Facebook in the number one position as the most popular social network in the U.K. However, after 17 straight months of growth, this drop of 400,000 users, is the first on record for Facebook in the U.K.

MySpace also lost 5% drop in traffic between December and January. They are still the number two social network in the U.K. with 5 million unique users.

Bebo only saw a 2% drop, and ranked third with a total of 4.1 million users.

Growth Rates at an End?

These drops in growth, if anything, point to the fact that the massive growth rates the networks were experiencing could not be maintained indefinitely. For example, Facebook's audience is 712% bigger than it was in January of 2007 and Bebo saw a 53% increase in the same period. I would argue that these numbers point to the networks being more popular, not less, than they were a year ago, so I'm not sure what Burmaster meant in that earlier statement unless he was solely referring to growth rates.

However, Facebook and Bebo's growth may have come from MySpace's loss. The News Corp. giant actually saw its number of unique users fall by 9% since January, 2007. Says Burmaster, "Growth among the big players looks to be more about getting people from their competitors, not attracting new people to social networking."

Does these findings foretell a saturation point for social networks? Or are the networks just not that cool anymore now that everyone uses them? In a BBC News article on the subject, Nic Howell, deputy editor of industry magazine New Media Age claimed, "Social networking is as much about who isn't on the site as who is - when Tory MPs and major corporations start profiles on Facebook, its brand is devalued, driving its core user base into the arms of newer and more credible alternatives."

Interestingly enough, the exodus from the larger networks may have had an impact on some of the smaller networking sites that grew during the month of January. Less trafficked social networking sites like Windows Live Spaces, which just launched a refreshed version with some Facebook-like features, saw a rise in number of users at this same time. Other U.K.-oriented sites like BBC Communities and Friends Reunited also saw growth in January.

isn't that wonderful - a home made motion control system



or this one: head tracking control

Thursday, February 21, 2008

how to publish facebook status updates to twitter

With the addition of public facing feeds to Facebook I am now able to publish my status on Facebook to Twitter.   
Here's how you can do it also.

First, find your status RSS feed on Facebook.   It is buried.  (Thanks Bizzle! for helping me find mine.)  To find it, you need to visit your profile on Facebook and on your mini-feed select "See All".   On the right you will see a list of items, select "status stories" and finally below this a feed link can be found.

Don't see a mini-feed on your profile page? 

You've most likely been changed your feed settings.  Resetting them to their default values from the feed preference page will bring back the mini-feed.

Finally add your newly found status RSS feed to the TwitterFeed service.  I set mine to update every thirty minutes, prefixed it with "From Facebook..." and am publishing just the title from the status feed.
 

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Now T-Mobile USA Announces Flat-Rate Too; SMS/MMS Included For $99.99

So now I may not have to change to AT&T (NYSE: T) after all: T-Mobile USA, which is the carrier I have been using for a long time (and Staci and Tricia here do too), has also announced a flat-rate unlimited package, costing the same as the ones announced by Verizon Wireless (NYSE: VZ) and AT&T earlier today. The plan from T-Mob is $99.99 and begins Feb. 21, and cover all types of mobile messages, including pictures, in addition to voice calls.

Meanwhile, Sprint (NYSE: S) said today that it was testing plans in four markets with unlimited voice, text and Web access for $119.99 and $149.99. Meanwhile, MVNOs Boost (owned by Sprint) and Helio. co-incidentally tweaked their unlimited plans earlier this month.. Also, second tier carriers Leap Wireless and MetroPCS offer unlimited calling for customers, but with no roaming.

AT&T Joins The Flat Rate Bandwagon, Hours After Verizon Wireless; Only Voice

Yea...finally competition is spurring some change. Hours after Verizon Wireless (NYSE: VZ) made it official that it was going flat-rate unlimited on certain plans, rival AT&T (NYSE: T) comes out with its own announcement: it would offer unlimited mobile phone calls for a flat rate of $99.99 a month, same as VZW. AT&T said the new fee option would be available on February 22 and that existing customers could sign up without having to extend their service contract. Unlike VZW, however, it only includes voice calling, and data and messaging will still require an additional fee. More info in the release here.

Sprint-owned Nextel and some other smaller carriers have had unlimited plan s for a while. As Dianne mentioned in her post on VZW, will Verizon's plan spark a price war that will lead to the commoditization of mobile voice calls? Seems like it now. According to UBS analyst John Hodulik, quoted in this Reuters piece, the move would likely spur Sprint (NYSE: S) to come out with an even more aggressive offering, which could be bad news for the entire industry. "A more competitive Sprint combined with increasing pressure on voice ARPU does not bode well for medium-term growth of carriers with significant wireless exposure," Hodulik said in a research note.

Verizon Rolls Out Unlimited Flat Rate Monthly Calling Plans

Verizon Wireless (NYSE: VZ) is rolling out an unlimited flat rate monthly plan today, which it says will help it lock down high end users. But is Verizon's "Nationwide Unlimited Anytime Minutes Plan"-starting from $99 a month-the beginning of the end for operators? That is, will Verizon's plan spark a price war that will lead to the commoditization of mobile voice calls?

USAToday.com reports that Verizon COO Jack Plating says the company "isn't expecting a price war," and that the plans are really aimed at high-end customers who spend at least $100 month for mobile services. But he added that Verizon would be able to differentiate itself with the quality of its network should other operators match its plan. Full list of changes from Verizon are here.

Plating also said that Verizon is not abandoning the lucrative "bucket business." Operators usually price minutes by the "bucket,"-for example, 450 minutes for $39.99 a month-and literally bank on the fact that consumers will go over their allotted talk time. "Millions" of wireless consumers apparently exceed their minutes each month, and are then charged up to $0.55 a minute for calls. Apparently, these charges are called "overages" and make up around 15 percent of the wireless industry's annual revenue.

Saturday, February 09, 2008

from powerpoint to webapp

via Hackernews
 
In my consulting career, I've been fortunate to see similar problems multiple times -- hopefully, I'll learn from each one and not make the same mistakes the next time I encounter that particular situation. One situation in particular involves a conversation with an entrepreneur, and it goes something like this :

Entrepreneur: I have an idea for a web app that will revolutionize the [blank] industry, and make us bajillions!

me: That's great! I can tell you are passionate and excited, and that's critical to your success. But do you have enough cash to pay for this coffee?

Entrepreneur: Yes, we have some funding to get started. And I have a business plan explaining our strategy, and I have a powerpoint deck of what the product does.

Me: That's even better! I'll have another espresso then.

Entrepreneur: We'd like you to get us started on our website development. Here's our feature set for beta release. How long is this going to take? How many people, and what other stuff do we need?

Me: Ummm....and that's where the conversation gets difficult. Because the business plan doesn't go into great detail about the product (it shouldn't), and the powerpoint slides have a bunch of boxes and arrows but don't show what the screens look like or what actions the user takes, we can assume the founding team hasn't thought much about how people actually use their product.

So at this point in the conversation, I face an uphill climb. I have to explain to (and convince) my client that they have a lot of hard work figuring out how their users are going to use this tool to accomplish their tasks, what those steps are, and what they look like. I have to tell them I don't know how long this is going to take, and I doubt anyone else knows either.

Most of these conversations end with me suggesting some homework for the founders. It's kind of a toolkit of useful things that you probably need, but it's definitely not everything you need. But it's a start.

  • read "Getting Real", the 37signals book. PDF, online, or print version, I don't care. Read it, and know it. When in doubt, consult this book. When not in doubt, consult this book and make sure you are still on the path. I hate to use the word 'bible', but it's the closest thing we have. It lays out the process of building a web product, from concept to delivery and beyond. If you're under 25, I guess you can real Paul Graham too.
  • setup a server on slicehost for development (for rails, anyway). Easy, cheap, and upgradeable.
  • likewise, set up a subversion repository to hold your source code on svnrepository.com. You could host your own, but I like the peace of mind I get knowing my source is backed up and secure. As a bonus, you get a Trac instance for bug tracking, and it includes a wiki and other tools to make developing your web app easier.
  • hire a designer, probably a freelance one, to draw some wireframes for you. Give them lots of your time, because that's how you're going to figure out what exactly your app does. This is probably the most important person on your team right now, and you should be focused on this. Ideally you can find a good reference through your network, but if not post a well-crafted ad on craigslist and look at their portfolios.
  • At the same time, you probably want a developer to start working on your site. Maybe the developer came first, and she's found someone designer-y to work with -- even better. Just get some stuff down on paper so you can discuss it, scrutinize it, see what works and what doesn't. If your designer is good, and you've spent enough time with them describing what you want, they should have something workable.
  • Start building your product. Get your developer, or outsourcer, or nephew or whatever to hack some code.
  • Your developers are probably following some sort of Agile process like Scrum. You should be seeing new features and changes on a daily or weekly basis. This is important, so you can play with your app as it is being born and give some feedback, change it, and make it better. If you're waiting weeks or months before peeking, you're doing it wrong. Good chefs taste as they cook.
  • Once you have something you like, and works, and does what it's supposed to, consider doing a limited release. Announce to your friends and families, have them play with it, ask for their feedback. If you can't get your loved ones to pay attention to something you've been slaving over, well, that's not a good sign.
  • While you're at it, put some site monitoring on it like site24*7.com -- so you'll know if you get swamped with too much traffic from Digg or Slashdot or nytimes.com, should they write about your site.
  • Go slow. look how your userbase is growing, if it is at all. Get some more users -- email more friends, or blog about it, or buy a few Google ads. Setup Google Analytics to track visitors to your site, and learn what is working and what isn't. Measure, always measure.
  • Get more feedback. Listen to your users. Make them happy. As your userbase starts to grow, spend some time thinking about how you can handle the extra load.

... and that's about it. You've just built and launched an app. Hopefully, you have some users and they like it,maybe even willing to pay for it. Maybe it sucks, and is a stupid idea. But more likely, it works, has some flaws, and could use some work. So work on it. Improve. Iterate.

Of course, what is considered 'best practices' today may not be the preferred methods of tomorrow. So I read a lot to stay on top of where the industry is going. A have a million feeds in my Google Reader account, but only a handful I consider invaluable -- including TechCrunch, Found+Read, Read/Write Web, and Signal vs. Noise.

Tuesday, February 05, 2008

Microsoft/Yahoo - a Good Deal for Silicon Valley ?

fantastic post via blog.pmarca.com
 
This post is not about the potential Microsoft/Yahoo merger.

Instead, let's just assume for the moment that Microsoft succeeds in its bid for Yahoo.

What would a Microsoft/Yahoo merger mean for startups in Silicon Valley?

Some smart people whom I respect a great deal believe that a Microsoft/Yahoo merger would be bad for Silicon Valley startups.

Says Bill Burnham, for example: "By swallowing up Yahoo, Microsoft will be removing one of the biggest and most active acquirors of start-ups in Silicon Valley... [making] M&A less competitive in general and [reducing] the # of potential exits... [which is] bad news for Internet [startups] and their VC backers anyway you look at it."

I respectfully disagree; I think that a Microsoft/Yahoo merger would have practically no impact on any high-quality Silicon Valley startup.

And here's why:

First, Yahoo has simply not been all that active in buying Silicon Valley Internet startups -- nor, for that matter, has Microsoft and Google -- contrary to popular perception.

Since Terry Semel's arrival as CEO, and continuing since his departure, Yahoo has become quite conservative when it comes to buying startups.

Yahoo only bought a relative handful of companies in 2007. The big ones were Right Media and Blue Lithium in the advertising space -- where Yahoo was highly motivated to make progress -- and Zimbra in the email space. The small number of other acquisitions (three in the US, I believe -- Mybloglog, Rivals, and Buzztracker) were tiny enough that Yahoo didn't even have to disclose the purchase prices.

Similarly, Microsoft bought surprisingly few companies in 2007. aQuantive was the big dog, and Microsoft was similarly motivated by a high degree of urgency to get on the advertising bus. Apart from that, you're looking at a very small number of very small deals, such as Screentronic and Jellyfish -- fine companies, I am sure, but tiny deals.

And even Google, which did more deals than Microsoft and Yahoo combined in 2007, only did a coule of sizeable ones -- Doubleclick (again that advertising thing), and Postini in email. And, Feedburner got a fine exit from Google given that it hadn't raised much equity funding. But most of the other companies Google bought largely to acquire engineers, and perhaps nascent products that hadn't yet shipped -- not doubles or triples or even necessarily singles from the perspective of venture-funded Valley startups.

Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google are only buying a relatively small number of smaller companies at all today -- so given that, taking Yahoo, or even Microsoft for that matter, out of the M&A races isn't going to reduce the number of deals going down each year by very much.

Second, the spectrum of companies that are doing Internet M&A is surprisingly broad, and, drawing from lists of deals from just 2005-2007, includes names like:

  • Akamai
  • Amazon
  • American Greetings
  • AOL
  • CBS
  • Cisco
  • CNet
  • Comcast
  • Digital River
  • Disney
  • eBay
  • Expedia
  • HP
  • IAC
  • Jupiter Media
  • Liberty Media
  • Marchex
  • MercadoLibre
  • Monster
  • Motricity
  • NBC Universal
  • New York Times
  • News Corp
  • Omniture
  • Priceline
  • Publicis
  • Real
  • Sabre
  • Scripps
  • Shutterfly
  • Sony
  • Valueclick
  • Viacom
  • WPP

So the base of buyers for Internet startups is considerably more diversified than you might think.

Third, consider what's likely to happen next.

Many of the traditional media companies -- in the US and overseas -- are looking at their core businesses today and seeing either rapid or imminent deterioration. This is certainly true for television, radio, music, newspapers, and magazines, and quite possibly also true for movies (given the decline in ticket sales and the recent apparent stalling out of the DVD market). And this is also true -- or will be true -- for a pretty broad range of various other businesses that are getting touched by the Internet.

For historical reasons -- skepticism about the potential of the Internet, combined with the false hope presented to many traditional businesses by the dot com crash of 2000-2002 -- many of these traditional companies are not yet appropriately positioned for an Internet-dominated future.

And now, if the Microsoft/Yahoo deal does go through, those same companies in many cases will be looking down a very scary double-barreled shotgun of an ascendant Google and an armored-up Microsoft, aimed right at their lunch, if you know what I mean.

I'm pretty confident guessing that the level of concern and even panic among many traditional companies -- particularly media companies -- is only going to escalate from here, as traditional non-Internet businesses in various sectors deteriorate and consumers continue moving en masse to the Internet.

And from there, it's not hard to guess that Internet M&A is likely to heat up considerably over the next several years, compared to the last several years, across a very interesting and surprisingly diverse cross-section of buyers.

Fourth, new buyers appear on a regular basis.

It wasn't that long ago that Google would not have gone on anyone's list as a significant buyer of other companies.

In the meantime, Facebook has emerged as a company with considerable financial firepower and is already starting to do M&A.

If past is prologue, several new buyers of one form or another will pop up over the next five years, and one or two of them will probably be on the "top buyers" list in 2010 or 2012 -- when you'd be selling a company you start today -- even though we probably haven't even heard their names yet.

Think also about the telecom companies, the mobile carriers, the Japanese consumer electronics companies, the Korean conglomerates, the mobile handset makers -- Nokia is ramping up their Internet M&A efforts right now, European media companies... not to mention the Chinese Internet companies. Any of these could emerge as meaningful buyers of Silicon Valley Internet companies of various forms in the years ahead.

After all, in a world where Cisco is buying social networking startups, anything is possible.

Fifth, building your startup with a goal of getting acquired is foolishness anyway, in my opinion. Smart people disagree with me on this, but I'll make my case in two points:

  • Big companies don't want to buy startups that want to get bought. Instead, big companies buy startups that have built something of value that they decide is important to them.

  • You can't possibly guess what things of value big companies are going to want to own in one or two or three years. The world is changing too fast -- witness the Microsoft hostile bid for Yahoo itself! -- and besides, big companies are Moby Dick and you can't understand the reasoning behind their decisions anyway.

Combine those two points with the fact that no big company buys that many startups each year anyway, and it's easy to see that the odds of you successfully anticipating something that a big company is going to want in the future and then actually selling your company to them -- as your strategy -- is a very risky proposition that is highly prone to failure.

And in fact, in my experience, most startups that start with the goal of getting bought, fail.

The formula for success in startups is the same today as it's always been, and it will be the same post-Microsoft/Yahoo:

Build something of value -- something that people want, and something that will be profitable at the appropriate point -- and the world is yours.

Successful companies -- companies that have built something of value -- have many options. They can stay private and throw off dividends. They can go public. They can get acquired by big companies who suddenly decide, hey, that looks really valuable, let's buy that. They can sell minority stakes to big investors or strategic partners at very high valuations. All options that are typically not open to the startup that started with the goal of getting bought and didn't build something of independent value.

Or, reduced to a phrase: the best way to get bought is to not be for sale.

Because of this, even if Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google stopped doing M&A completely, the strategy of any high-quality startup in the valley would not change one bit.

Sixth, I believe that a Microsoft/Yahoo merger would actually be a net positive for many high-quality Silicon Valley Internet startups, for a completely different reason.

Again, suppose the takeover bid succeeds. You're looking at probably a year of government approvals, followed by at least a year of integration.

You can't speed up the first part, because that's up to the government, and they don't react well when you scream "hurry up!" at them. And you don't want to speed up the second part, because integrating two companies of the scale and scope of Microsoft and Yahoo is an absolutely enormous undertaking and you want to make sure you do it right, or you're not going to get any of the benefits.

In practice, that will be two years in which both Microsoft and Yahoo will most likely be considerably less aggressive on rolling out new products and new initiatives -- because the key people at both companies will be consumed with the merger.

And, just think, if they are buying fewer companies as a consequence, that also means they're less likely to buy one of your competitors and come after you while you are building your thing of value.

I think this merger, if it happens, will help clear the field for a whole new generation of Silicon Valley Internet startups to create and scale the next set of killer consumer services that will go mainstream and be used by hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

Where does that leave us?

The Microsoft/Yahoo deal, if it happens, means very little for the entrepreneurial climate in Silicon Valley, or the opportunities available to you and your startup.

Your job is exactly the same as before: build something people want, scale it up, make sure it's defensible, and make sure you can make money with it.

Build a company you are proud of.

If you do those things, you'll do just fine; if you don't, neither Microsoft nor Yahoo nor any other big company were going to rescue you anyway.

Nobody ever said this was easy, but in a world moving this fast and this much in flux, it certainly is fun!

Monday, February 04, 2008

everything you need to know about advisors

lovely post from Venture Hacks

Microsoft/Yahoo - a Bad Deal for Silicon Valley

via Burnham's Beal
 
There's a ton of discussion today about Microsoft's unsolicited bid for Yahoo.  Much of the discussion focuses on whether or not the deal is a good thing for Microsoft, Yahoo or Google's shareholders.  While it's possible it could be a good or bad deal for one, the other, or all three, one thing is for sure:  this a bad deal for Silicon Valley start-ups and their VCs.

How could that be?  Because by swallowing up Yahoo, Microsoft will be removing one of the biggest and most active acquirors of start-ups in Silicon Valley.  The intense competition between Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo has arguably been one of the main factors helping drive up M&A activity and prices for internet related start-ups.   It seems like every rumored acquisition over the past few years has had all three fighting in some way to win the deal.

Even though Yahoo has been wounded of late, it still had a market cap in the 10's of billions of dollars which allowed it to be a legitimate competitor for any deal under $1BN and in fact Yahoo has been a pretty active player in that market whether its del.icio.us, flickr, Rivals, etc.

If it's acquired by Microsoft, that will leave only two Internet media/search acquirors with the ability to easily do sub $1BN deals.  What's more, while Microsoft has recently show a willingness to deal really big deals such as Acquantive and now Yahoo, it has traditionally been less willing to smaller "tuck in" deals, deals that Yahoo has traditionally been much more active in.  Indeed, Microsoft has traditionally been dismissive of these deals because they just don't move the needle for them and their engineering staffs still retain a relatively high degree of NIH attitude.

Losing one of the Valley's most reliable "tuck in" acquirors and second place bidders is a net negative for the Valley.  It will make M&A less competitive in general and will reduce the # of potential exits for "me too" start ups" to 2 instead of three.  That's bad news for Internet content/search start-ups and their VC backers anyway you look at it.

Friday, January 25, 2008

10 Steps to Innovation

via wonderful Found&Read
 
1. Don't take things for granted
2. Watch for inconveniences
3. Watch for possible gaps
4. Follow tech trends
5. Watch how your competitors work
6. Observe different people in different places
7. Capture every idea
8. Create a master list of problems
9. Review your master list of problems
10. Take action

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Do as I say, not as I did

lovely article, again thanks to Found|Read

Last September, Ev Williams gave a speech about some of the mistakes he made as CEO of Odeo.

Since then, a lot has happened. We turned out to totally wrong about one thing: "So what's he doing to fix these mistakes? Not refunding the VCs their investment, that's for sure." That's exactly what Williams did just a month later , refunding his VCs and angels their $5 million stake.

Williams' fortunes have changed radically since then, as Obvious Corp, which he formed to buy Odeo, has also developed the smash hit web product of the season, a casual blogging tool called Twitter.

Williams said he created Obvious to pioneer "a new model for building and running web products," one that uses cheap and rapid development to test an idea before turning it into a company. So far, it appears to be working.

This week, Williams indulged us by reviewing the list of Odeo-screwups we covered last fall and, importantly, shared with us what he's doing differently this time at Twitter.

Mistake #1: "Trying to build too much"
Retake: Where Odeo had a mess of products, Twitter is singularly focused on the short-form shout-out. Tell your friends what it is that you're doing in 140 characters or less. The thrift and simplicity of Twitter posts are comparable to the site, which simply takes the messages from SMS, IM, web form, or third-party application and sends them back out. Says Williams via email, " It does very little. (In a good way.)"

Mistake # 2: We weren't the target users of our product
Remake: The makers of Odeo weren't podcasters and didn't listen to many podcasts themselves, so they lacked intuition for their users' needs. Twitter is the opposite, according to Williams, because it's a product his team uses and loves. "[Obvious employee] Jack Dorsey introduced the idea of Twitter to us, because he'd been wanting it for a long time. We built a prototype and started using it internally and, based on that, decided to invest further."

Mistake # 3: "Not adjusting fast enough"
Remake: Odeo couldn't compete when Apple introduced a competitor, but Twitter has tried to be more agile. Rather than stay bound to long-term strategic visions, Twitter has made many adjustments to its product over the last several months, aiding its astronomical growth this March.

Says Williams, "We didn't have the formula right for Twitter at first. We liked the app, but for the first few months, it wasn't clicking with users. We changed the positioning, the relationship model, and other things until it started working. I think we could have been faster, but we got there. Now we're trying to adjust to the scaling requirements."

Mistake # 4: "Raising too much money too early"
Remake: Williams' new theory is "Some things are perfectly worthwhile but don't need to be a company" in the "hits-driven" consumer web business , where anything less than a 45-degree trend on the growth chart considered flat-lining. Due to the pressure of responsibility to its funders, Odeo had to be a company before it had proved it was a successful product. Twitter hasn't raised any outside funding yet, though Williams says "It's likely we'll need to before long, but we're past the point where I think it would be too early."

Mistake # 5: "Not listening to my gut"
Remake: Williams says, "This has a lot to do with who I'm working with, what we're working on, raising money, etc. Safe to say, we're doing better in all departments."

Saturday, January 12, 2008

Angel Funding Toolkit

Angel Funding Toolkit

Posted: 11 Jan 2008 07:31 AM CST

Aruni Gunasegaram has a great post up on GigaOm's Found|Read titled My Funding ToolkitIt's a nice summary of stuff that Aruni has put together in the quest for her next round of angel funding.

 

via Ask the VC

Friday, January 11, 2008

Youth speaking about their handset preferences

interesting to take a look
 
via the [non-working] Wireless World Forum.

PhoneCasting Raises $500,000 Seed Funding

via MocoNews
 
Houston-based startup PhoneCasting has raised $500,000 from undisclosed angel investors. The company plans a service to let people listen to podcasts on a phone, and also create podcasts by recording them with the handset. PhoneCasting bought Podlinez and modified it into a white label service, and will offer its platform and services for free reports Tech Confidential . Founder and president Michael Sharp hopes to get a wide audience and sell advertising, and tie podcasts with affiliate marketing opportunities—"for example, if a podcaster reviewed the latest Stephen King novel, a listener could press a key to buy the book on Amazon.com (NSDQ: AMZN)". The proceeds will be split with 20 percent going to PhoneCasting and the rest to the podcaster. The company is seeking a $10 million first round.

Top Ten Myths of Entrepreneurship

great list of points via Guy Kawasaki blog
 
This is a guest post by Scott Shane as a follow up to his entrepreneurship test. He is the A. Malachi Mixon Professor of Entrepreneurial Studies at Case Western Reserve University. He is the author of seven books, the latest of which is The Illusions of Entrepreneurship: The Costly Myths That Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Policy Makers Live By . Many entrepreneurs believe a bunch of myths about entrepreneurship, so here are ten of the most common and the realities that bust them:
  1. It takes a lot of money to finance a new business. Not true. The typical start-up only requires about $25,000 to get going. The successful entrepreneurs who don't believe the myth design their businesses to work with little cash. They borrow instead of paying for things. They rent instead of buy. And they turn fixed costs into variable costs by, say, paying people commissions instead of salaries.

  2. Venture capitalists are a good place to go for start-up money. Not unless you start a computer or biotech company. Computer hardware and software, semiconductors, communication, and biotechnology account for 81 percent of all venture capital dollars, and seventy-two percent of the companies that got VC money over the past fifteen or so years. VCs only fund about 3,000 companies per year and only about one quarter of those companies are in the seed or start-up stage. In fact, the odds that a start-up company will get VC money are about one in 4,000. That's worse than the odds that you will die from a fall in the shower.

  3. Most business angels are rich. If rich means being an accredited investor –a person with a net worth of more than $1 million or an annual income of $200,000 per year if single and $300,000 if married – then the answer is "no." Almost three quarters of the people who provide capital to fund the start-ups of other people who are not friends, neighbors, co-workers, or family don't meet SEC accreditation requirements. In fact, thirty-two percent have a household income of $40,000 per year or less and seventeen percent have a negative net worth.

  4. Start-ups can't be financed with debt. Actually, debt is more common than equity. According to the Federal Reserve's Survey of Small Business Finances, fifty-three percent of the financing of companies that are two years old or younger comes from debt and only forty-seven percent comes from equity. So a lot of entrepreneurs out there are using debt rather than equity to fund their companies.

  5. Banks don't lend money to start-ups. This is another myth. Again, the Federal Reserve data shows that banks account for sixteen percent of all the financing provided to companies that are two years old or younger. While sixteen percent might not seem that high, it is three percent higher than the amount of money provided by the next highest source – trade creditors – and is higher than a bunch of other sources that everyone talks about going to: friends and family, business angels, venture capitalists, strategic investors, and government agencies.

  6. Most entrepreneurs start businesses in attractive industries. Sadly, the opposite is true. Most entrepreneurs head right for the worst industries for start-ups. The correlation between the number of entrepreneurs starting businesses in an industry and the number of companies failing in the industry is 0.77. That means that most entrepreneurs are picking industries in which they are mostlikely to fail.

  7. The growth of a start-up depends more on an entrepreneur's talent than on the business he chooses. Sorry to deflate some egos here, but the industry you choose to start your company has a huge effect on the odds that it will grow. Over the past twenty years or so, about 4.2 percent of all start-ups in the computer and office equipment industry made the Inc 500 list of the fastest growing private companies in the U.S. 0.005 percent of start-ups in the hotel and motel industry and 0.007 percent of start-up eating and drinking establishments made the Inc. 500. That means the odds that you will make the Inc 500 are 840 times higher if you start a computer company than if you start a hotel or motel. There is nothing anyone has discovered about the effects of entrepreneurial talent that has a similar magnitude effect on the growth of new businesses.

  8. Most entrepreneurs are successful financially. Sorry, this is another myth. Entrepreneurship creates a lot of wealth, but it is very unevenly distributed. The typical profit of an owner-managed business is $39,000 per year. Only the top ten percent of entrepreneurs earn more money than employees. And the typical entrepreneur earns less money than he otherwise would have earned working for someone else.

  9. Many start-ups achieve the sales growth projections that equity investors are looking for. Not even close. Of the 590,000 or so new businesses with at least one employee founded in this country every year, data from the U.S. Census shows that less than 200 reach the $100 million in sales in six years that venture capitalists talk about looking for. About 500 firms reach the $50 million in sales that the sophisticated angels, like the ones at Tech Coast Angels and the Band of Angels talk about. In fact, only about 9,500 companies reach $5 million in sales in that amount of time.

  10. Starting a business is easy. Actually it isn't, and most people who begin the process of starting a company fail to get one up and running. Seven years after beginning the process of starting a business, only one-third of people have a new company with positive cash flow greater than the salary and expenses of the owner for more than three consecutive months.

Thursday, January 10, 2008

The Art of the Sign Up Page

interesting article found thanks to Found|Read.
 

Sunday, December 30, 2007

thought nuggets

In a course of just few days I have read two wonderful posts from my two favorite bloggers Marc Andreessen and Martin Varsavsky about applied note taking from Marc and tons of "thought nuggets" of Martin collected through Twitter and posted in 3 batches.....  Althogh very different, these posts have something in common - how to organize your thoughts and transfer them into bigger products. 
 
I keep on being impressed by insightfulness of Marc's writings and productivity and diversity on Martin. Both are CEOs of their companies and board members and advisers of dozens of other ventures...  Also, husbands and fathers of few children....
 
the question I have: do they sleep?

Saturday, December 29, 2007

The Google Enigma

Matt Mullenweg, creator of Wordpress, links to a terrific piece from Strategy + Business called The Google Enigma. Is the search giant "a model or an enigma?" (This pub, from consulting shop Booz Allen Hamilton is one we reference from time to time. It's worth reading.)
 
read here
 
big thanks to Found+Read

Friday, December 28, 2007

good question to ask yourself before starting your company

 
Q: In your experience, what are the chances a talented entrepreneur will make $1M from his startup? (And no, I don't mean making $150K/year for 6 years and 8 months. :)

A: (Brad): I have no clue as it depends on many different inputs as to be an impossible question to answer simply (e.g. you need to know a lot more to determine anything that resembles an accurate analysis of the potential outcome.  However, this is a thought provoking question which I'll answer a different way then intended. 
If the goal of a talented entrepreneur is to make $1m from a startup, he should consider getting a job that makes $150k / year for 6 years and 8 months. Whenever I meet an entrepreneur that is focused on a specific economic outcome, I lower his chance of success because I think he's focused on the wrong thing.  By definition, an entrepreneur should be striving for a significant economic payoff.  Yet the economic uncertainty of entrepreneurship is so high and the range of outcomes so broad that an entrepreneur just has to believe that if he nails it, good financial things will happen.
The direct tradeoff between a specific financial outcome ($1m) and a salary over time ($150k * 6.667 years) doesn't really capture the essence of the financial trade in entrepreneurship.  In a success case, the $1m could turn into $10m, $100m, or even more.  Or $0.  The $150k * 6.667 is still going to be $1m. 
 
Which would you rather have ?  (a) 0 < x < $100m+ or (b) $1m < x < $2m?  If (a) you are an entrepreneur.  If (b) you should stick with your day job.

Thursday, December 20, 2007

some funny HR math

sounds VERY familiar....... ahhhrrrrrrr
via Found + Read - read here
 
I have noticed some funny math in my startups over the years.

This funny math doesn't start until after VC funding — so to better explain it, I must first rewind the clock to our pre-institutional investor stage.

See, I do funding a bit different than other entrepreneurs. I launch the company myself. I form (some of) the team. We build the product. We get to revenues … and we even go profitable. In short: we get our ship lean, mean, and pumping efficacy from every valve.

Then we go get VC funding (less dilution, more control, etc.)

It's so predictable what happens next. Ya gotz some green in the bank and a newly formed HR department, replete with a salivating recruiter, brimming with job reqs to be filled. Go! Go Go!

Staffing at warp speed always scares the crap out of me.

I approve each new req. — queasy — because this new person will now solely be focused on what used to be 1/20th of my job. As I sign the req, I hope they will be better at "it" than me, care more about "it", and get more of "it" done.

But, in my heart, I feel the funny math coming on.

Each new person that gets added to a startup, instead of adding an integer worth of value actually temporarily subtracts value. The old person, instead of doing their old job, is now training the new person. Add a body and get less for your pleasure. 1+1= ½

Eventually you end up having more new people than you do old – I call this being "upside down". That is when the ownership problem starts to compound. Nobody has really been here long enough to know, or care, and once the "new job excitement" has worn off, accountability starts to dwindle. In my old company, this problem was pervasive. The more people we had, the longer it took for anyone to pick up the phone when it rang.

It won't always be this way. If you survive your terrible twos, you will eventually get more efficient with each new body. Slowly 1 + 1 = 1.25, then 1.50 and it probably never gets much higher than 1.75. With the exception of specialized industries like wholesale and investment banking, the most efficient companies in the world can achieve $1M of revenue, per employee, per year. Google is $1M, Dell is at $900K, Cisco $570K. The average of non-financial Fortune 500 is about $290K.

In my current company, I made a firm decision to combat the chaos of these mathematics from the outset – wielding the best weapon I have in business: honesty. I started warning people about it from day one. During "all-hands" company meetings, whilst folks munch pizza and hear about our financial numbers, I remind them " 1+1= ½". When I see five people in a meeting that only requires two, "1+1= ½" is all I have to say.

Way to succeed by believing into it

another great post from Found+Read.
 
 
the author expands on delusions which can help you being successful

Tuesday, December 18, 2007

Will it Fly?

A great framework for evaluation of the new business ideas. Discovered through Found+Read (I love this blog!).
 
Executive summary (thanks to the same Found+Read people):
  1. Tractability: How difficult will it be to launch a worthwhile version 1.0?
  2. Obviousness: Is it clear why people should use it?
  3. Deepness: How much value can you ultimately deliver?
  4. Wideness: How many people may ultimately use it?
  5. Discoverability: How will people learn about your product?
  6. Monetizability: How hard will it be to extract the money?
  7. Personally Compelling: Do you really want it to exist in the world?
Full article here

The Ideas People

Check this out

Monday, December 17, 2007

Mobile Ads Will Go Big By 2010: IAB UK Survey

 
By Carlo Longino - Thu 13 Dec 2007 03:15 PM PST

Mobile advertising will become a mainstream medium over the next three years, according to results of a newly released survey (warning: PDF link) from the Internet Advertising Bureau in UK. The IAB surveyed its members and garnered responses from 41 companies, with just over half of them coming from agencies. While its not a deep pool of responses, it does give some indication of how companies active in internet advertising view mobile. The full report can be downloaded here. Among the findings:

-- 41 percent of respondents say mobile ads will be mainstream in 2010, and 27 percent believe theyll make it to the mainstream in 2011, while 20 percent believe it will happen in 2008.

-- The ability to create one-to-one marketing relationships because of the personal and intimate nature of mobile phones is cited as the most popular reason why mobile ads will be successful. The ease of response, and the ability to target and make ads very relevant were also mentioned. More after the jump.

-- The main barrier to the respondents use of mobile ads was a lack of evidence of the success and effectiveness of the medium. While the demand for a clear-cut ROI is understandable, this is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: until mobile ads become more widely used, there wont be a huge amount of data about their efficacy. The push isnt just solely for volume, though, as marketers are also looking for standardized and consistent measurements.

-- Many of the same issues were cited as barriers to growth of mobile advertising, along with the issue of reach. Advertisers are looking for volume in mobile, just like in other media.

-- Its unclear what role operators should play. Some people believe operators shouldnt be involved at all. Others say they should play a supporting role, while some believe they should take the lead. This is a big question hanging over the sector. While plenty of big names and small companies are moving ahead with their plans, so too are operators, many of which see mobile advertising as a huge potential revenue stream. Both sides seem to be headed for a collision here, and the uncertainty of what operators will try do, or what theyll allow could be holding back some marketers from embracing mobile ads.

Sunday, December 16, 2007

how you should run your business

Ignore how you "think" you should run your business.
Start running it the way you "know" in your heart you can run it.
Success will follow.
 
via Found+Read

Why should you spend time (and money) on design

via Found+Read
 
Why Design Matters, Too
Posted: 27 Nov 2007 09:01 AM CST
Let's face it, startup founders have their hands full with a multitude of issues, large and small. Most attention is placed on the nuances of business models, viral marketing, user acquisition, etc. But an often overlooked success factor in building a web business — or any business — is design. Good design can often tip the scales in your favor; make your company very hard to ignore. In this post, I'll explain a few important reasons why design matters so much.
1. Good design implies credibility
You only get one chance to make a first impression. When people visit your website, most won't go through a fact-finding expedition to figure out your Series A numbers, who your investors are, and what your story is just to decide if your company can be trusted. Initial trust is a gut-feeling. The easiest way to put your company on that path is via well executed visual design that shows you put some effort, and money, into delivering a first-rate and satisfying experience to your customers. They will notice. Ignore design and you risk creating distrust of your business from day one, and driving up that bounce rate.
2. Brand+1
There's no such thing as a 'neutral' brand experience. This little word is kicked around a lot and its meaning is often confused. Your company's 'brand' is how other people feel about your company. (Yes I said feel!) Put another way, it's what your customers say about you, not what you say to them. You might even call it your company's personality. For example, what do you think about Amazon.com? That's their brand. If Amazon has done a good job, what you think will match up with what they want you to think, also known as their "brand values." Every interaction between your company and your customer affects your brand in a positive or negative way. Well-executed visual communication can go a long way to providing the right takeaways.
3. Usability is life and death
In the world of web 2.0 and beyond, a UI is what turns an idea into a usable product. A well-executed, intuitive UI is what turns a usable product into a successful one– especially today when there are so many options available. There have indeed been successful pieces of software over the years that were poorly designed, but in these cases you can point to lack of competition, closed-standards, or sheer market power. Web 2.0 changes this, and is forcing companies to create simple and elegant solutions that create the shortest paths from start to finish for their tasks. This is especially true with free apps, where little is invested. The age of feature bloat and design by engineers, with all due respect, is over.
4. Design is a powerful business advantage
There's another adage about building a better mousetrap. Somebody had to design that mousetrap. For you MBAs out there, first-mover advantage is powerful, but great design by a second-mover can nullify it. Do you remember who released the first MP3 player in America? If you do, kudos, and you probably also know that they aren't around anymore. The Apple iPod was three years late to the game, has less features than competing devices (the Zen, and now the Zune as well), and yet completely dominates the market today. Why? An innovative UI in the clickwheel, and purely emotive and beautifully-designed branding that pioneered music as a necessary component to your lifestyle.
5. Connect with your customers emotionally
Design is one of the only ways you can connect with your customers emotionally. Design allows you to deliver visceral experiences that can affect people. Recent advances in neuroscience, specifically FMRI, have shown that people tend to act on emotion, then back it up with reasoning later (if at all). This revelation has spawned a whole new marketing movement, known as emotional branding. The vehicle is pure design. Emotional brands, says Marc Gobé, create "strong…personalities that closely match the aspirations of their customers" through "the strength of their culture and the uniqueness of their brand imagery." Apple is so successful at this that it spawned a book, The Cult of Mac. Facebook's new product pages are an excellent vehicle for emotional branding, too: people become 'fans'; when they publicly declare support for your product, they are saying your values match up with their own. You've connected with them emotionally. You've won.

Jason M. Putorti is currently the lead designer of Mountain View-based Mint.com, which makes software for online consumer money management. Prior to Mint, Jason founded an advertising agency and publishing company in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Friday, December 14, 2007

Sales: a Scince or the Art?

A post from from Seth Levine's VC Adventure saying it is science....

Other opinions?


Sales is a science, not an art

Andy Blackstone had a great comment to my post yesterday on Atul Gawande's New Yorker article about explicit behavior (in the case of the article, doctors using checklists). I've edited the comment slightly for clarity.

An important concept in the article is that the checklists are not aimed at a specific condition but at an overall process in the ICU. One of the objections I often encounter in my consulting practice is "my business is different" - I'd contend that at the process level that's most often not true. The resistance to adopting these checklists often comes from doctors that think the "art of medicine" is being threatened by the regimen of the checklist. In my practice, I see sales managers and salespeople with the same objection. In fact, as the article states, it is the reduction of the routine aspects of the process to the rigors of the checklists that enables the art to emerge. Finally, I was struck by the feeling of the doctors in the ICU that there was just no time available in the midst of their chaotic day to deal with checklists - a reaction I've seen in lots of business managers as well. This is a major barrier to implementing any new business process. The success of checklists in the ICU in not only reducing accidents, deaths, and costs, but in making the doctors time efficient, can be seen as new business processes are implemented as well.

It's the perfect lead in to some thoughts about what's wrong with many sales organizations – a topic I've been meaning to write about for a while). Sales, in my experience, is significantly more scientific than people typically give it credit for. And because people (sales professionals, CEOs, boards) don't always see sales that way, they let slide behavior that is counterproductive to the overall goals of the organization ( i.e., to sell more and – importantly – to sell with increasing efficiency and predictability). Specifically, the lack of a detailed and well documented process for sales results in:

  • Salespeople wasting huge amounts of time on deals that are hopeless, because there's no enforced checklist that keeps them from continuing to pursue opportunities where essential events aren't being checked off
  • Sales cycles that languish while salespeople have "good meetings" instead of checking off the next task on the sales process checklist
  • Executive management, sales management, and BOD members searching for the magician that will improve the "black magic" sales situation instead of incorporating and enforcing process that ensures success independent of superstar performance
  • Turnover in the sales organization but without improved performance
  • A lack of predictability in sales performance (lumpy and generally random sales results)
  • A stagnant pipeline – sales people can't handle as many deals as they should be because they're spending too much time on deals they shouldn't be working on and the deals themselves take longer than they should because they're not actually being pushed through a real process
  • "Fuzzy" pipeline reviews (where every deal has a story associated with it, but where the basic questions of where the deal stands are never really answered)

High performing sales organizations have real rigor in their process and religiously enforce that rigor from qualifying leads, to initial contacts, to how they move a prospect through their pipeline to an extremely detailed "closing" list that guides an organization through the final stages of each close. They use this rigor to determine which leads to follow up on, what prospects are real, and what steps remain to a sale for each and every potential customer. They quickly put prospects onto a hold list when they don't meet specific near-term buying criteria and they generally have a good view of what's possible at the end of each quarter because they know exactly what steps remain for each prospective customer, who needs to sign off on what, and how they will (or will not) be able to make that happen in a timely fashion. Pipeline reviews are focused around where a prospect is in the sales process and are crisp reviews of each account (a few minutes is more than enough time to cover an account at a high level – spending more time than that is either wasting time or a sign that the "story" is covering up the lack of real progress or understanding of that account). Every sales person (not to mention the VP and CEO) can take you through the stages of an account, the "[insert company name] way of selling", and the closing process. In short, the entire company is on the same page around what it takes to turn a prospect into a customer.

All of this isn't to suggest that sales as a discipline and sales people as practitioners of that discipline don't possess skills that range far beyond the ability to check items off a list. To the contrary, skilled sales people are extremely nuanced in their ability to understand the buying patterns of their prospects, navigate the internal landscapes of customers and, of course, effectively convey the value proposition of the product they are selling. But sales people are human and – like doctors in an ICU – benefit from the rigor and oversight that is provided by process.

Thanks to Andy for sharing his thoughts on this subject with me in both his comment and in email (which I borrowed from liberally in writing this post). Head to his site to see more about the sales process work he does at Blackstone Associates.

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

when founder-CEOs do really well, that also increases the chances that they’re going to be replaced

HBS's web magazine Working Knowledge has another useful piece today that addresses the reasons why founding CEO's are so often replaced by their boards of directors. It also reveals a frustrating paradox: "when founder-CEOs do really well, that also increases the chances that they're going to be replaced."

The Founding CEO's Dilemma: Stay or Go? is based on a new work co-authored by Noam Wasserman, a professor of entrepreneurial management at Harvard, and Henry McCance, Chairman of VC firm Greylock Partners. We've highlighted a few important points, including the authors' Rich or King Test, which they borrowed from Onset Ventures. Take it to see if you're replaceable or irreplaceable founder.
Says Wasserman to Working Knowledge:

Typically, early in the life of a company—when it is developing its first product or service—the founder who conceived of the idea and began developing it is the perfect person to lead the company … However, when that milestone is reached … The challenges within the company change so dramatically…

Now, the product has to be sold: You have to create a sales organization, manage multiple functions, deal with customers, handle more complex financial issues, and deal with a very different set of challenges for which many founder-CEOs are not equipped. … it is precisely their success that has increased the need to replace them at this point.
Of course this pattern is exacerbated when a founder-CEO brings in outside investors. VC's, says Wasserman, "often make the assumption that the person who started the company is going to have to be replaced along the way, and may therefore have a quicker 'trigger finger.'"
Then Wasserman shares one way to tell if you are more, or less, likely to be replaced:
The Rich vs. King Test
We teach a case in our first-year entrepreneurship course on a Silicon Valley VC firm called Onset Ventures … called the "Rich versus King" test. It gets to this essential trade-off around what drives an entrepreneur: Is it the need to control the company (that is, to be King), or is it the drive for success, particularly financial success (Rich), which may require that the entrepreneur step aside once certain business milestones have been reached? Onset does not like to invest in founders who "want to be King" out of concern that they will not want to be replaced if such a step is required in order for the company to be successful.
The only founders who can assure their ability to continue as CEOs are those who don't raise outside money from Onset and its peers.
Of course, that outside money is often necessary to build a valuable company, so King-motivated founders usually have to give up a lot of potential growth to remain King. In the entrepreneurship class, I push students to think hard about why they are choosing to be founders to begin with, and then to make conscious choices that are consistent with those motivations. The founders who get into trouble are often the ones who make decisions without regard for "Rich versus King," and who therefore decrease the chances that they will achieve their goals because they haven't made choices consistent with their motivations.
 
via Found+Read

Thursday, November 29, 2007

Ad Revenue Models

Question: (1) How do Web 2.0 companies like Feedburner make money?  (2) What makes a blogger or content provider select one network or blog community over another (i.e., are the bloggers themselves being paid or are they essentially working for free)?  (3) How is online media advertising different now than during the internet boom?
The most popular Web 2.0 revenue model is based on advertising. Publishers (blogs, media sites, etc) get paid by advertisers who advertise on their site. FeedBurner is an ad network and while it made some money off of licensing its platform to large publishers, most revenue came from the ads inserted into the feeds. This ad inventory comes from either the company's own direct ad sales force or from ad networks. Some of the ads are CPM based (impressions viewed) while others are CPC ($ per click...a la Google). The publisher generally keeps 60-70% of the ad dollars and the ad network gets 30-40%. So, if Motorola runs an ad campaign through an ad network like FeedBurner, they might pay $5-10/CPM (cost per thousand impressions). The ad network then takes that ad and serves it up on the various websites it has deals with. If the ads are viewed 1,000,000 times, Motorola would pay the network $5-10,000. The network would keep $2-4,000 and the publishers would get the rest. In the case of bloggers, they first pick which ad networks to go with (usually based on which drive the most revenue for the space given) and then approve different ad campaigns. They get a cut of those ad dollars.
More advertisers understand the benefit of online advertising and so, there are more ad dollars flowing into this space than during the Bubble. More importantly, Google has created an entire ecosystem based upon its CPC model where advertisers only pay when ads are clicked on. They feel there is more accountability since they only pay when an action is taken. Also, there is very little cost associated with running many of these publisher sites, so it doesn't take much to get to break even.
That said, the economy is likely sliding into recession and ad budgets will get slashed. CPC and CPA (cost per action) based revenue should hold up better than CPM based ones since there is a clearer ROI. In  2000, Yahoo saw its revenue plunge 40% in one year. When the cycle corrects, there will be quite a lot of carnage in the ad supported publisher world. Smart operators will get their costs inline and focus on driving the best possible results for advertisers.
 
Via Ask the VC

Monday, November 26, 2007

Ask The VC on Early Stage Board of Directors

Dick Costolo (aka Mr. Ask the Wizard) - the founder/CEO of FeedBurner (now a Googler) has another outstanding post up titled Early Stage Board of DirectorsIn his delicious way, Dick talks through how he thinks about the potential composition of a Series A board and gives entrepreneurs some ammunition for their potential investors when they say "let's have a board with five Series A investors and no founders."
via Ask the VС

Friday, November 16, 2007

Van Gogh on personal productivity

Van Gogh's philosophy for producing good work:
"You have to eat well, be well housed, have a screw from time to time, smoke your pipe and drink your coffee in peace."
 
Via pmarca blog Via Reuters

Thursday, November 15, 2007

PayPal Mafia

a great story of a great company with great people....
 

angels enjoy better returns than VCs?

from RedHerring.com
Angel Returns Outpace VCs'
 
At a time when many venture capitalists are retreating from early-round deals, a new study has found that angels, the earliest investors, are wearing solid-gold halos.
 
The study, sponsored by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation and the Angel Capital Education Foundation, found that members of organized angel investing groups had an average 27 percent internal rate of return, or the annualized compounded rate of return. That compares with VC returns for all investing stages, which historically average in the mid-teens, said Robert Wiltbank of Willamette University,  one of the study's authors.
 
Overall, the angel groups investors posted a return of 2.6 times their original investment after 3.5 years. While 7 percent of the exits were home runs with returns of more than 10 times the investment, more than 52 percent of exits came at a loss. More than 60 percent of the angel investors at least broke even on their overall portfolio.
 
The study, conducted last spring and summer by Mr. Wiltbank, an assistant professor of strategic management, and Warren Boeker, professor of management at the University of Washington, asked the 539 participating angel investors to detail their investments as far back as they could. Sixty-two percent of the exits occurred after 2004, while only 8 percent happened before 2000.
 
Though other studies focus on angel investment activity, Professor Wiltbank said this is the largest to look at investment returns.
Professor Wiltbank said the study found that angels who took a more active roll with their portfolio companies fared better.
 
"You can see strong effects when investors do a little extra due diligence; and if they keep in touch with the ventures a couple times a month, the numbers are stronger," he said.

In Search of Inexperience

Great post from Guy Kawassaki's blog about fresh vs. serial entrepreneurs. Not that I agree with everything said (mind Martin Varsavsky, a founder of FON and tons of other companies before), it does give some bonus to the fresh startupers.
 
 
hpgarage.jpg TechCrunch published a great guest post by Glenn Kelman, the CEO of Redfin, called "Entrepreneur 2.0." It inspired me to piggyback on his idea that investing in "serial entrepeneurs" who have already been successful might not be all that it's cracked up to be and write this post.

Both our posts run counter to the theory that many entrepreneurs, wealthy from their previous smashing success but restless and too young to die (or become venture capitalists, which is roughly the same thing) are the best bets for the next big thing.

Superficially, it's hard to fault this "back the proven entrepreneur" theory. For one thing, from a venture capitalist's point of view, if you fund a serial entrepreneur and she succeeds, you "knew" that she was proven. If she fails, at least you backed someone for a good reason—that is, she was proven—so your limited partners shouldn't get too bent out of shape.

That's a lot better than backing a first-time entrepreneur who fails—then you are just stupid. (Also, if you back a first-time entrepeneur, and she's successful, you take the credit: "It's because of my hands-on coaching and guidance.") But, just as Glenn wrote, if you think about it, great, world-changing companies such as Hewlett-Packard, Apple, eBay, Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, and YouTube were zero for three according to the official venture-capitalist spec sheet: Proven team, proven technology, and proven business model.

Hence, I would like to declare my support for Glenn's perspective and help him make the case that second-time entrepreneurs are not necessarily the be-alls and end-alls.

  • Serial entrepreneurs try to prove that their first success wasn't a fluke. Rather than starting from the basis of technology ("isn't this cool?") or customers ("there must be a better way"), the reason for existence is "I'm going to prove that I'm talented." This is a bull shiitake reason for starting company compared to solving people's problems or changing the world.

  • Serial entrepreneurs cannot distinguish between causation and correlation. The root cause of earlier success may have simply been blind, dumb luck, but few people realize this and even fewer will admit. Thus, they have the hollow arrogance of people who just go lucky instead of people who have been truly tested, and arrogance is a bad thing in entrepreneurs.

  • Serial entrepreneurs are likely to use the same methods again. How can you fault them for using the same methods that made the successful the first time? For example, if they built a high-end computer the first time, they build a high-end computer the NeXt time. If they used dealers the first time, they use dealers the second time. If they gave everything away to get eyeballs and sold the company to a bigger, dumber, richer company, they try try that "business model again."

  • Serial entrepreneurs don't (or can't) work as hard. When you have a 5,000 square foot house, a second house in Montana, a car made by a company whose name ends in "i," a spouse, and kids, attitudes change. Indeed, attitudes should change or people never grow up. However, it's one thing to work to survive and another to work for fulfillment. They can say they're just as hungry this time, but the point is that no one had to ask if they were hungry the first time.

  • Serial entrepreneurs don't get smacked around enough. Life is good as a serial entrepreneur: they walk in, tell people that their last company was sold for a bazillion dollars, and now they're starting another one, and it's a privilege and honor to invest. Who's going to poke holes in their strategy when Sequioia, Kleiner Perkins, et al are issuing term sheets and ever lesser venture capitalist is sucking up? No one. And that's too bad because they won't get anyone checking their sanity.

  • Serial entrepreneurs fill new, unfamiliar roles in their next companies. For example, in the first company the person was an engineer who became the vice-president of engineering who became the CTO. Just because you were good at writing designing chips doesn't mean you're CEO material in your next fabulous fabless chip company. As Glenn says in his post, "This means that what I used to be really good at — designing software — I don't do as much of anymore, and what I never had to learn how to do — manage people – I now do all the time."

  • Serial entrepreneurs hire their buddies who were with them the first time. Thus, the entire founding team suffers from all the problems listed above. People who don't know what they don't know are few and far between, but a startup needs this kind of people to push the boundaries of what's possible in what ways. Ignorance is not only bliss; it's also empowering.

I once heard Mike Moritz of Sequoia explain what kind of entrepreneurs he wanted to invest in. I'm paraphrasing: "Guys under thirty who are building a product that they themselves want to use." Amen, baby! I vote for two guys or gals in a garage who are an unproven team, unproven technology, and unproven market.

Sunday, November 11, 2007

Generic Range of Equity Desired By a VC for Round 1 or 2

Question: What's a completely generic range of equity a VC typically
wants for a round 1 or round 2 investment?

Most VC's will generally say they target 20-30% ownership in a company
to "make it worth their time". This means that if they invest $3m
early on, they expect the post-money to be around $10-15m and if, in
later rounds, they are investing $10m, they expect to have a $30-$50m
post-$.

Often, however, VC's will use the "percentage" threshold as a means by
which to increase money into a round or to get the valuation down. I
have seen a given VC say they need 25% ownership for deal (to get
valuation down) and do a more competitively sought deal at 15% two
weeks later. In the end, two things drive all of this. First, there
are legitimate minimum investment amounts a firm needs to have per
deal. A $500 million fund will never get its capital deployed by doing
$2m and $3m deals. They need to put $7-10m to play early and $20m+
over the life of the investment. Second, the valuation (and hence %
ownership) will be driven by attractiveness and competitiveness of the
deal. In the end, it is really about valuation (assuming their
investment appetite remains in a set range).

via Ask the VC

Thursday, November 08, 2007

Sorry to talk so long...

Good point from Seth Godin's blog

I was at a gala a few weeks ago (featuring no less than ten speakers). At least 80% of them began their talk by saying, "I know you're hungry, but..." or "I know it's late, but..." or "I know you want to go home, but..." and then apologized for giving a speech.

If your speech needs to be prefaced by an apology...

don't give it.

That's why they call it giving a speech. It's a gift. If you have to apologize, it's no longer a gift, is it?

Our collective fear of public speaking has created a host of awkward situations and events. It's pretty simple: Be brief. Or don't come at all. Don't do anything you need to apologize for.

(and brief means sixty seconds, usually. That's enough to say hi, to say thanks and to move on.)

Tuesday, November 06, 2007

Top 10 Slide tips

 
1. Keep it simple
2. Limit bulet points & Text
3. Limit animations
4. Use high-quality graphics
5. Have a visual theme, but avoid templates
6. Use appropriate chars
7. Use color well
8. Chose your font well
9. Use video and audio [well]
10. Spend time is slide sorter
 
basically, its all easy..... make it right! :)
Just practice and keep on looking at the best presentations so far.... more great stuff to come!.... may be by you!!!

product innovation by Steve Jobs

Innovation is not about saying yes to everything. It's about saying NO to all but the most crucial features.
 
from Steve Jobs's private presentation about the iTunes Music Store to some independent record label people in June of 2003

7 lies that prevent Your Great Idea from becoming a Real Business

great motivation article from LifeRemix
 
Here is an executive summary:
 
7 common excuses for not starting a Real Business
1. I'm too busy right now. I'll start when I have more time.
2. After I get an MBA, I'll be ready to start up.
3. I hate sales.
4. I'll do some research after watching a TV show.
5. I don't know anything about business.
6. I don't have startup capital.
7. Before doing anything else, I need to write a business plan.
 
the full article will expand on all all those FUD (Fears, Uncertainties & Doubts) and will suggest strategies for overcoming those.

Monday, November 05, 2007

"Free is more complicated than you think"

a very insightful article from O'Reilly Radar

Peter Brantley sent a link to a great summary of Scott Adams' nuanced discussion of the tradeoffs in making Dilbert freely available on the web . The punchline: "Free is more complicated than you think."

Adams reports that putting Dilbert online for free

"gave a huge boost to the newspaper sales and licensing. The ad income was good too. Giving away the Dilbert comic for free continues to work well, although it cannibalizes my reprint book sales to some extent, and a fast-growing percentage of readers bypass the online ads with widgets, unauthorized RSS feeds and other workarounds."

This sense of tradeoffs in making content freely available is consistent with our experience at O'Reilly. We find that making a book freely available can help visibility and sales of a book on a little-known topic, but for a well-known topic or author, who benefits little from the additional exposure (like Scott Adams), it can have a slight cannibalization effect on print sales. So, as a beginning science fiction author, Cory Doctorow used "free" to build his career, while Stephen King found the results of his experiments with free to be disappointing. (I explored these tradeoffs in my article Piracy is Progressive Taxation.)

The point is that we need more than one model. There is no one-size-fits-all answer. Advertising is a great model for people who can create or collect content that will generate sufficient traffic to pay for itself on the limited revenue per view provided by advertising. But that takes far more traffic than most people realize. Asking people to pay works well when the potential audience is smaller, and the cost of creating the content greater than can be recouped by advertising. But even then, you need to use "free" to some extent to make sure people find your content. If content is locked up too tightly, it drops out of the internet conversation.

read the full article here

via O'Reilly Radar

Saturday, November 03, 2007

back of the envelope valuation for start-ups

  • Sound idea = $1 million
  • Prototype = $1 million
  • Quality management team = $1 – 2 million
  • Quality board = $1 million
  • Product rollout or sales = $1 million
  • TOTAL potential value: $1 – 6 million

via Found+Read